EAAPLEnterprise AI Architecture Pattern Library
EAAPLLibraryAI GovernanceEAAPL-GOV003
EAAPL-GOV003Proven
⇄ Compare

AI Approval Workflow

⚖️ AI GovernanceAPRA CPS230EU AI Act🏭 Field-tested in AU

[EAAPL-GOV003] AI Approval Workflow

Category: Governance / Deployment Control Sub-category: Change Management & Approval Gates Version: 1.3 Maturity: Proven Tags: approval-workflow, deployment-gates, separation-of-duties, change-management, APRA, EU-AI-Act Regulatory Relevance: APRA CPS230 §23–§26, EU AI Act Article 14, ISO/IEC 42001 §8.4, NIST AI RMF MANAGE 1.1


1. Executive Summary

The AI Approval Workflow establishes a multi-stage, evidence-gated approval process that every AI system must traverse before production deployment. It implements separation of duties as an architectural principle—technical, security, ethics, regulatory, and executive reviewers operate as independent gates, each with defined authority and accountability.

This pattern solves a persistent enterprise problem: AI systems deploy through standard software change management processes designed for deterministic code, which fundamentally misses AI-specific risks including fairness, explainability, adversarial vulnerability, and regulatory classification. By inserting AI-specific review stages with defined entry and exit criteria, the workflow ensures that deployment decisions are informed, documented, and defensible.

For CIOs and CTOs, this pattern delivers three strategic outcomes: regulatory defensibility (documented approval evidence for every deployed model), risk reduction (no model enters production without expert sign-off on applicable risk dimensions), and accountability (named approvers with defined authority create clear responsibility chains). Implementation integrates with existing ITSM and change management tooling, minimising adoption friction while adding material governance value.


2. Problem Statement

Business Problem

AI systems are promoted to production through standard software release processes (JIRA tickets, change advisory boards) that do not assess AI-specific risk dimensions. Approvers lack the expertise and structured information to make informed decisions. Approval becomes a rubber stamp rather than a genuine risk control.

Technical Problem

Multi-stage approval requires coordination across technical, security, compliance, ethics, and executive reviewers. Without a structured workflow, reviews happen ad-hoc, evidence is unstructured, decisions are verbal, and there is no audit trail connecting deployment to approval.

Symptoms

  • AI models deployed without documented fairness or ethics review
  • Security reviews of AI systems using generic application security checklists
  • Legal/compliance review occurring after deployment when issues are discovered
  • No traceable connection between deployed model version and approval evidence
  • Different AI projects following different approval processes based on team culture
  • Inability to answer regulators' question: "who approved this AI system for deployment and based on what evidence?"

Cost of Inaction

  • Regulatory: APRA examination finding; EU AI Act Article 14 (human oversight) non-compliance
  • Legal: Deployment of non-compliant AI creating retrospective liability without approval documentation
  • Operational: Fast-moving development teams deploy without governance, creating ungoverned AI estate
  • Reputational: High-profile AI failure with no documented governance process amplifies regulatory and media response

3. Context

When to Apply

  • All AI systems being promoted to production (regardless of risk tier — tier determines approval depth, not whether approval applies)
  • Existing deployed models undergoing material changes (new training data, new use case, architectural change)
  • Third-party AI integrations being enabled for first time
  • Models being promoted from staging to production after staging validation

When NOT to Apply

  • Within-experiment model retraining (automated retraining of existing approved models within previously approved parameter bounds)
  • Internal experimentation environments with no production data or customer impact
  • Non-AI software changes (standard ITSM change process applies)

Prerequisites

  • Model registered in AI Model Register (GOV001) with MRID
  • Risk assessment completed (GOV002) with documented risk tier
  • Technical documentation package complete per risk tier requirements
  • Deployment environment provisioned with monitoring controls configured

Industry Applicability

Industry Applicability Approval Authority Level Regulatory Driver
Banking & Insurance (AU) Critical Board Risk Committee for Critical-tier APRA CPS230 §23
Financial Services (EU) Critical CRO + Legal for high-risk AI EU AI Act Article 14
Healthcare Critical Clinical Safety Officer for patient-facing AI TGA software regulation
Government High Senior Responsible Officer APS AI Ethics Framework
Technology / SaaS Medium VP Engineering + Legal Customer contractual obligations
Retail Low–Medium AI Governance lead Consumer protection obligations

4. Architecture Overview

The AI Approval Workflow is architected as a sequential gate process with parallel review capability within each gate. The pattern makes three foundational architectural decisions that distinguish it from generic change management workflows.

First principle: Risk-tier-driven depth, not fixed stages. A Low-risk internal analytics model does not require the same approval rigour as a Critical-tier credit decisioning model. The workflow uses risk tier (from GOV002) to determine which stages are mandatory, which are advisory, and what evidence is required at each stage. A four-tier depth model is defined: Express (Low), Standard (Medium), Comprehensive (High), and Full Board (Critical). This prevents the framework becoming a bottleneck that business units circumvent.

Second principle: Evidence gates, not opinion gates. Each approval stage has defined entry criteria (what evidence must exist before the stage opens) and exit criteria (what the approver must review and attest). Approvers cannot mark a stage complete without linking to specific assessment artefacts. This transforms approval from "did the committee meet?" to "did the committee review specific evidence and make an informed decision?" The distinction is material under regulatory examination.

Third principle: Separation of duties by role type. The five review stages—Technical, Security, Ethics, Regulatory, and Executive—must be performed by different individuals from different organisational functions. A single person cannot approve their own technical and ethics review. This separation is enforced at the workflow layer: the system will not accept approvals from the same individual for more than one stage on the same model. This satisfies APRA CPS230 §26 governance requirements for independence in risk oversight.

Stage Architecture. The five stages are:

Stage 1: Technical Review validates that the model meets technical quality standards: performance benchmarks met, model card complete, integration tests passing, fallback behaviour verified, monitoring hooks installed. Technical review can be performed by the AI/ML engineering team but not by the model's own developers (peer review at minimum).

Stage 2: Security Review validates AI-specific security controls: adversarial robustness testing completed (per GOV002 security module), input validation controls in place, model endpoint access controls verified, supply chain provenance confirmed, and penetration test scheduled or completed. Security review is performed by the enterprise security team, not the AI team.

Stage 3: Ethics Review assesses fairness, explainability, and responsible AI alignment. This stage is mandatory for all customer-facing models and all models making consequential decisions about individuals. Ethics reviewers must be independent of the development team and must include at least one non-technical reviewer. For Critical-tier models, the AI Ethics Review Board (GOV009) performs this stage.

Stage 4: Regulatory/Compliance Review validates that the model is compliant with all applicable regulatory obligations: data processing agreements signed (third-party models), privacy impact assessment completed, EU AI Act registration submitted (if applicable), prohibited use case confirmation, and geographic restriction compliance. This stage is performed by Legal/Compliance, not the AI or business team.

Stage 5: Executive Sign-off provides accountability at the appropriate authority level based on risk tier. Low-tier models may not require executive sign-off; Critical-tier models require CRO or Board Risk Committee acknowledgement. This stage creates the governance anchor — a named executive accountable for the deployment decision.

Parallel Review Optimisation. Stages 2, 3, and 4 (Security, Ethics, Regulatory) can execute in parallel once Stage 1 (Technical) is complete. This parallelisation reduces the calendar time from sequential 5-stage to effectively 3-stage (Technical → parallel Security+Ethics+Regulatory → Executive). For a well-prepared Medium-tier model, the full workflow completes in 5–7 business days.

Conditional Re-review. Material changes to an approved model trigger a partial re-review. The system categorises change types and maps them to required re-review stages: a model architecture change triggers Technical + Security; a new use case triggers Ethics + Regulatory; a new training dataset triggers Technical + Ethics. This prevents full re-review for minor changes while ensuring material changes receive appropriate scrutiny.


5. Architecture Diagram

ARCHITECTURE DIAGRAM
flowchart TD subgraph Input["Input Layer"] A[Deployment Request] B{Risk Tier Router} end subgraph Reviews["Review Gates"] C[Technical Review] D[Security + Ethics + Regulatory] E{All Stages Passed?} end subgraph Decision["Decision Layer"] F[Executive Sign-off] G[Deployment Token Issued] H[Rejected or Remediation] end A --> B B -->|pre-flight fail| H B -->|tier-routed| C C -->|pass| D C -->|fail| H D --> E E -->|no| H E -->|yes| F F -->|approved| G F -->|rejected| H style A fill:#dbeafe,stroke:#3b82f6 style B fill:#f3e8ff,stroke:#a855f7 style C fill:#f0fdf4,stroke:#22c55e style D fill:#f0fdf4,stroke:#22c55e style E fill:#f3e8ff,stroke:#a855f7 style F fill:#f0fdf4,stroke:#22c55e style G fill:#d1fae5,stroke:#10b981 style H fill:#fee2e2,stroke:#ef4444

6. Components

Component Type Responsibility Technology Options Criticality
Pre-flight Validation Service Business Logic Validates prerequisites before workflow initiates; checks GOV001 and GOV002 status Workflow engine + REST calls to GOV001/GOV002 APIs Critical
Risk Tier Router Business Logic Determines approval track (Express/Standard/Comprehensive/Full Board) from GOV002 risk rating Rules engine; workflow BPM routing Critical
Stage Orchestration Engine Workflow Manages stage sequencing, parallel execution of stages 2-4, SLA tracking, escalations Camunda BPM, ServiceNow Workflow, AWS Step Functions Critical
Evidence Gate Enforcer Business Logic Blocks stage completion until required evidence artefacts are linked Custom validation rules; document management integration Critical
Reviewer Assignment Service Identity/Access Routes each stage to correct approver pool based on risk tier and organisational role LDAP/AD group-based routing High
Separation of Duties Enforcer Security Control Prevents same individual approving multiple stages on same model Cross-stage approver deduplication check Critical
SLA Monitor & Escalator Operations Tracks time-in-stage; escalates approaching and breached SLAs Workflow timer events; notification service High
Approval Audit Logger Compliance Records every approval decision with approver identity, timestamp, evidence links, rationale Immutable log (append-only DB or S3 WORM) Critical
Deployment Token Issuer Security Issues time-limited, model-version-specific deployment authorisation token consumed by MLOps pipeline JWT with model version claim; short expiry (24h) Critical
Change Classification Engine Business Logic Classifies change type for deployed models; determines re-review scope Rules engine with change type taxonomy High
GOV001/GOV002 Integration Integration Updates model register and risk assessment records with approval outcome REST API integration High

7. Data Flow

Primary Approval Flow (Comprehensive Track — High Risk)

Step Actor Action Output
1 Model Owner Submits deployment request with MRID, target environment, deployment date Approval request ID; pre-flight checks initiated
2 Pre-flight Service Validates GOV001 MRID exists, GOV002 assessment complete, tech docs present Pre-flight pass confirmation
3 Tier Router Reads GOV002 risk rating; routes to Comprehensive track Track assignment; Stage 1 notification sent to technical reviewer pool
4 Technical Reviewer (peer, not developer) Reviews model card, performance benchmarks, integration tests, monitoring config; links evidence Stage 1 approval attestation + evidence bundle reference
5 Stage Orchestration Validates Stage 1 evidence gate; opens Stages 2, 3, 4 in parallel Parallel review notifications to Security, Ethics, Regulatory reviewers
6a Security Reviewer (CISO team) Reviews adversarial test results, access controls, supply chain provenance Stage 2 approval or findings requiring remediation
6b Ethics Reviewer (AI Ethics Officer) Reviews fairness metrics, explainability report, responsible AI alignment Stage 3 approval or ethics concerns
6c Regulatory Reviewer (Legal/Compliance) Reviews DPA status, PIA completion, prohibited use confirmation Stage 4 approval or compliance gaps
7 Aggregation Gate Checks all three parallel stages passed; compiles consolidated status Consolidated parallel review outcome
8 Executive Approver (Risk Officer for High-tier) Reviews summary package; makes deployment decision Stage 5 approval/rejection/conditional with rationale
9 Deployment Token Issuer Generates time-limited JWT with model MRID and version claim Deployment authorisation token
10 GOV001 Integration Updates model register status to APPROVED; links approval artefact Model register updated; deployment permitted by MLOps gate

Error Flow

Condition Detection Response Recovery
Stage failure (reviewer finds critical issue) Reviewer marks stage Fail with finding reference Workflow pauses; owner notified with consolidated findings Owner remediates; resubmits for failed stages only (not full workflow restart)
SLA breach at any stage SLA monitor timer event Escalation to stage owner's manager; AI Governance notified Priority queue assignment; daily status reporting until resolved
Separation of duties violation attempted Stage enforcer check Approver rejected; alternative reviewer requested AI Governance assigns independent reviewer
Deployment token expired before use MLOps pipeline check Pipeline blocked; re-approval required Fast-track Stage 5 re-approval (token extension) for unchanged model

8. Security Considerations

Separation of Duties (Critical Control)

  • System enforces: no individual can approve more than one stage for a given model deployment
  • Workflow engine maintains approver identity per stage; cross-check performed before accepting approval
  • Model owners cannot approve any stage on their own model (explicit exclusion list)

Deployment Token Security

  • JWT deployment tokens carry: MRID, model version hash, approved environment, issuer, expiry (24 hours)
  • MLOps pipeline validates token signature before permitting deployment
  • Tokens invalidated immediately if model version changes post-issuance

Audit Log Integrity

  • All approval decisions written to WORM-compliant immutable log
  • Approval records include: approver identity, timestamp, decision, rationale text, evidence artefact hashes
  • No deletion permitted; corrections via superseding record only

OWASP LLM Top 10 Mapping

OWASP LLM Risk Approval Stage Coverage Control
LLM01 Prompt Injection Stage 2 Security Mandatory prompt injection test results required as evidence
LLM02 Insecure Output Handling Stage 1 Technical Output validation controls verified in technical review
LLM04 Model Denial of Service Stage 2 Security Rate limiting and resource controls verified
LLM08 Excessive Agency Stage 3 Ethics + Stage 4 Regulatory Agency scope review mandatory for autonomous AI
LLM09 Overreliance Stage 3 Ethics Human oversight mechanisms verified; escalation paths documented

9. Governance Considerations

Responsible AI

The Ethics Review stage (Stage 3) is the primary responsible AI gate. It requires sign-off from a designated AI Ethics Officer or, for Critical-tier, the full AI Ethics Review Board (GOV009). Ethics review covers: fairness assessment outcomes, explainability adequacy, human override mechanisms, and vulnerable population impact.

Model Risk

The approval workflow is a key control in the enterprise model risk framework. Approved models receive a Model Risk Rating that references the approval record. Model risk committee reviews approval outcomes quarterly.

Traceability

Every deployed model has a traceable approval chain: MRID → Assessment ID (GOV002) → Approval Request ID → Stage approver identities → Deployment token hash → Deployed model version. This chain can be reconstructed from audit logs for any deployed model at any point in time.

Governance Artefacts

Artefact Owner Frequency Regulatory Linkage
Approval Decision Record (per model) AI Governance Per deployment APRA CPS230 §23; EU AI Act Article 14
Approval SLA Compliance Report AI Governance Monthly ISO 42001 §8.4
Separation of Duties Violation Log CISO Monthly APRA CPS230 §26 independence requirement
Executive Approval Register Risk Committee Quarterly Board governance obligations

10. Operational Considerations

SLOs

SLO Target Measurement
Stage 1 Technical review SLA ≤3 business days Per approval request
Stages 2-4 parallel review SLA ≤5 business days Per approval request
Stage 5 Executive review SLA ≤2 business days Per approval request
Total workflow (High tier) ≤10 business days End-to-end
Workflow engine availability 99.5% 30-day rolling

Monitoring

Metric Target Alert Threshold
Approvals awaiting >SLA 0 Any approval stuck >SLA
SoD violations attempted 0 Any attempt
Deployments without valid token 0 Any event — critical alert
Approval conversion rate (submitted → approved) Tracked Significant change indicates assessment quality issue

Disaster Recovery

Scenario RTO RPO Recovery
Workflow engine unavailable 4 hours 1 hour Emergency manual approval via documented exception process; retrospective system entry
Audit log unavailable 1 hour 0 WORM storage; read from replica

11. Cost Considerations

Cost Drivers

Driver Cost Type Notes
Reviewer time (dominant cost) Variable FTE Stage 1: 0.5 days; Stages 2-4: 1 day each; Stage 5: 0.25 days
Workflow platform licence Fixed SaaS Camunda Cloud: $2K–$20K/yr; ServiceNow: included in existing licence
Audit log storage Variable Minimal (KB per approval record); 7-year WORM retention

Indicative Cost Range

Track Reviewer Time Infrastructure Total per Approval
Express (Low) 1 day × $1,500 $10 ~AUD $1,510
Standard (Medium) 2.5 days × $1,500 $10 ~AUD $3,760
Comprehensive (High) 4.75 days × $1,500 $10 ~AUD $7,135
Full Board (Critical) 6+ days × $1,500 + expert $10 ~AUD $20,000+

12. Trade-Off Analysis

Option Comparison

Option Description Pros Cons Recommended For
A: Five-stage workflow (this pattern) Sequential gates with parallel 2-4 Comprehensive; defensible; separation of duties enforced 5–10 day cycle time Regulated industries
B: Single approval gate One cross-functional committee reviews all dimensions Fast; simple Single point of failure; no separation of duties; committee lacks depth across all dimensions Very small organisations
C: Automated approval for low risk Fully automated for Low-tier with human override Scales to high model volume Requires high confidence in automated checks Volume model refresh pipelines
D: Continuous deployment with post-deploy review Deploy first; review second Maximum speed Inverts risk management; regulators will not accept Never for customer-facing consequential AI

Architectural Tensions

Tension Stance Mitigation
Speed vs. Thoroughness Thoroughness wins for High/Critical; tiered tracks for Low/Medium Risk-tier routing ensures proportionate effort
Automation vs. Human Judgement Human judgement required at every stage Automation assists (pre-population, evidence linking) but cannot substitute
Centralisation vs. Delegation Central workflow; delegated stage authority Risk tier maps to authority level; avoid central bottleneck

13. Failure Modes

Failure Likelihood Impact Detection Recovery
Reviewer unavailability blocking SLA High Medium SLA monitor alert Backup reviewer pool; SLA escalation
Evidence quality insufficient to support decision Medium High Stage reviewer rejection Pre-submission checklist; evidence quality coaching
Approval granted without reviewing evidence (rubber stamp) Medium Critical Audit log review; periodic approval quality spot-check Mandatory evidence link validation; approver accountability review
Deployment without approval token Low Critical MLOps pipeline gate Immediate incident; model rollback; governance investigation
Approval shopping (submitting to easier reviewer) Low High Cross-approval pattern analysis Role-based reviewer assignment; no model-owner reviewer selection

14. Regulatory Considerations

APRA CPS230

  • §23: Risk management framework requires documented approval process for changes to critical operations. This workflow provides the required documentation.
  • §26: Governance arrangements require independence in risk oversight. SoD enforcement directly satisfies this.

EU AI Act

  • Article 14: Human oversight requirements for high-risk AI. Stage 3 (Ethics) and Stage 5 (Executive) provide the human oversight attestation required before deployment.
  • Article 16(f): Providers of high-risk AI must draw up technical documentation. Stage 1 (Technical) gate enforces documentation completeness.
  • Article 43: Conformity assessment for high-risk AI. Approval record serves as conformity assessment documentation for Annex III use cases.

NIST AI RMF

  • MANAGE 1.1: AI risk responses are decided upon and implemented. Approval workflow is the primary implementation of MANAGE function.
  • MANAGE 2.2: Mechanisms to respond to AI risk prioritised. Stage-based escalation implements this.

ISO/IEC 42001

  • §8.4: Operational planning and control requires documented procedures for AI system deployment. This workflow pattern satisfies §8.4.

15. Reference Implementations

AWS

Component AWS Service
Workflow Orchestration AWS Step Functions + Human Approval tasks
Deployment Token AWS Lambda (JWT generation) + KMS signing
Audit Log DynamoDB (append-only) + S3 WORM export
Notifications SNS + SES
Evidence Storage S3 + presigned URL

Azure

Component Azure Service
Workflow Orchestration Azure Logic Apps + Azure DevOps Approval Gates
Deployment Token Azure Functions + Key Vault signing
Audit Log Azure Cosmos DB (append mode) + Immutable Blob

On-Premises / Enterprise ITSM

Component Technology
Workflow ServiceNow Custom Workflow / Camunda BPM
Token Internal PKI JWT issuance
Audit Log Immutable SIEM (Splunk with index-level WORM)

Pattern Relationship Dependency Direction
EAAPL-GOV001 AI Model Register Input — MRID required; output updates register GOV001 → GOV003 → GOV001
EAAPL-GOV002 AI Risk Assessment Input — risk tier determines approval track GOV002 → GOV003
EAAPL-GOV007 AI Audit Trail Complementary — approval decisions stored in audit trail GOV003 → GOV007
EAAPL-GOV009 AI Ethics Review Board Called — Critical-tier models invoke ethics board for Stage 3 GOV003 → GOV009
EAAPL-CMP003 EU AI Act Compliance Satisfies — Article 14 human oversight documentation GOV003 → CMP003

17. Maturity Assessment

Overall Maturity: Proven (Level 3)

Dimension Score (1–5) Evidence
Stage definition completeness 5 All five stages with entry/exit criteria
SoD enforcement 5 System-enforced; no manual bypass
Risk-tier routing 4 Four tracks defined; gap is automated tier adjustment based on post-deploy signals
ITSM integration 3 Reference implementations exist; custom integration required per enterprise
Re-review automation 3 Change classification rules defined; automated triggering from MLOps not yet standardised

18. Revision History

Version Date Author Changes
1.0 2024-03-01 EAAPL Working Group Initial publication
1.1 2024-09-01 EAAPL Working Group Added parallel stage execution optimisation
1.2 2025-02-01 EAAPL Working Group Added deployment token architecture; EU AI Act Article 43 mapping
1.3 2025-08-01 EAAPL Working Group Added conditional approval track; re-review automation guidance
← Back to LibraryMore AI Governance